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Abstract 
The psychological continuity theory of personal identity has recently been accused of 
not meeting what is claimed to be a fundamental requirement on theories of identity - 
to explain personal moral responsibility. Although they often have much to say about 
responsibility, the charge is that they cannot say enough. I set out the background to 
the charge with a short discussion of Locke and the requirement to explain 
responsibility, then illustrate the accusation facing the theory with details from Marya 
Schechtman. I aim some questions at the challengers' reading of Locke, leading to an 
argument that the psychological continuity theory can say all that it needs to say 
about responsibility, and so is not in any grave predicament, at least not with regard 
to this particular charge. 
 
Introduction 
The psychological continuity theory of personal identity (PCT) has recently been ac-
cused of not meeting one of the fundamental requirements on theories of identity. 
That requirement is to explain personal moral responsibility. While psychological 
continuity theories like that of Parfit often have much to say about responsibility, the 
charge is that they cannot say enough. Although they take their inspiration from 
Locke, they fail to grasp a central insight of Locke's and as a result fail to meet the 
requirement. I will set out the background to the charge with a short discussion of 
Locke and his insight regarding responsibility, then I will illustrate the accusation 
facing the PCT with details from Marya Schechtman. I will then aim some questions 
at the proposed reading of Locke, ending up with an argument that the PCT is not in 
anything like a grave predicament, at least not with regard to this particular charge. 
 
Section 1: Locke, the Responsibility Requirement and Appropriation 
Locke's discussion of personal identity has probably been more influential than any 
other in the literature, and it has had a significant influence on what are taken to be 
the requirements on a theory of personal identity - on what any theory of personal 
identity must provide. One of these requirements appears to be that the theory must 
explain personal responsibility. Although Locke does not set this out explicitly, a 
number of things he does say suggest that he thinks it is indeed a requirement. 
 
His clearest statement concerns the term 'personal identity'. It, says Locke, 'is a 
Forensick Term, appropriating Actions and their Merit' (1975: 346). That certainly 
appears to imply a conceptual connection between identity and responsibility or 
desert. He continuously stresses the advantage of his theory in meeting a requirement 
like this. Arguing against the notion that personal identity could consist in sameness  
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of material substance, he presents the case of a prince's consciousness getting into the 
body of a cobbler. 'Every one sees,' he says, 'that he [the person in the cobbler-body] 
would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince's Actions' 
(1975: 340). Note how he juxtaposes identity and accountability. His theory - that 
identity lies in 'sameness of consciousness' - explains this accountability. The theory 
works in the case of other thought-experiments as well, and he appears to support his 
conclusions with appeal to matters related to responsibility. He writes, 'tis plain 
consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to Ages past, unites 
Existences, and Actions, very remote in time, into the same Person, as well as it does 
the Existence and Actions of the immediately preceding moment. So that whatever 
has the consciousness of present and past Actions, is the same Person to whom they 
both belong. Had I the same consciousness, that I saw the Ark and Noah's Flood, as 
that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now, I could no 
more doubt that I, that write this now, that saw the Thames overflow'd last Winter, 
and that viewed the Flood at the general Deluge, was the same self, place that self in 
what Substance you please, than that I that write this am the same my self now whilst 
I write (whether I consist of all the same Substance, material or immaterial, or no) 
that I was Yesterday. (1975: 340-341) 
 
Kenneth Winkler adds, 'He supports this conclusion by observing that I am as 
"concern'd" for an action done a thousand years ago as I am for one done a moment 
ago, provided the ancient action has been "appropriated to me now by this self-con-
sciousness"' (Winkler 1991: 205). 
 
Passages like those just quoted lead Winkler and others1 to ascribe an 'appropriation 
theory' of personal identity to Locke. Your experiences and actions are those you ap-
propriate to yourself, understanding Locke's term 'appropriate' in the sense of 'to take 
possession of for your own' (OED meaning 3). The following passage from §26 is 
presented as the final confirmation of this reading of Locke: 
 
This personality extends itself beyond present Existence to what is past, only by 
consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to 
itself past Action, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason, that it does the 
present. (1975: 346) 
 
Reading Locke's account as an appropriation theory is consistent with Locke's preoc-
cupation with responsibility in his discussion of identity and offers the explanation of 
responsibility that I alluded to above. If you were not aware of past actions as your 
own, you would not feel responsibility for them and there would be something 
infelicitous about holding you responsible for them. It is by consciousness that I am 
'myself to myself (1975:345) and this grounds my responsibility. 
                                            
1 Notably Mackie (1976) and Curley (1982). 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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Section 2: How the Psychological Continuity Theory fails to meet the 
requirement 
Marya Schechtman also picks up these trends in Locke's thought and, although she 
disagrees with many aspects of Locke's view, sees them as recommending that view. It 
is precisely these trends that she wishes to capture in her own narrative theory (which 
she later calls the 'self-understanding view') of identity. And it is these trends that she 
sees contemporary psychological continuity theories missing in Locke and not 
themselves capturing, to their detriment. 
 
The PCT presents personal identity as being a matter of overlapping psychological 
connections - causal connections like those between intentions and later actions, 
experiences and memories, continuing dispositional states (beliefs, desires, etc) and 
so on. There do not need to be direct connections between x at time t and y at t+n for 
x and y to be the same person, as long as there is a continuous chain of overlapping 
connections between them. Unlike Locke (or, at least, Locke as his view was 
characterised above), continuity theorists accept that there can be cases of 
experiences and actions that are mine even though I no longer have any conscious 
awareness of them. As long as there are enough overlapping connections that form a 
chain back to that action,2 it was mine. 
 
Schechtman concedes that Locke's theory is too strong. Insisting that I must have 
conscious awareness of a past experience for it to be mine would rule out many 
formative, but forgotten, or central, but unconscious, features of my identity. The PCT 
avoids this consequence; but Schechtman contends that in dropping the demand for 
direct awareness, it loses the capacity to explain responsibility. 
They [experiences of which we are conscious] are also, at least according to Locke, 
tied to responsibility in this way, because we can know them to be our actions or 
experiences, we have a responsibility to and for them that we could not otherwise 
have. The Lockean insight thus seems to rest on the special relation we have to 
experiences while we are conscious of them. According to the psychological continuity 
theory, however, there are many experiences - even whole life phases - that are 
counted as mine even though I no longer have any consciousness of them at all. They 
are no more connected to my present consciousness than they would be by a 
sameness of substance view. The original appeal of Locke's theory is thus lost on this 
view.(Schechtman 2005: 16) 
 
Locke can explain our responsibility through consciousness: 'because we can know 
them to be our actions' we can take responsibility for them. The PCT has no such ex-
planation to offer; overlapping psychological connections forming an indirect link 
back to an action account at best for causal responsibility - not the moral 
responsibility that is at stake. The difference is between 'it occurred because of you' 
and 'it is your fault'. 
                                            
2 That is, a chain of the right sort of pattern. See Beck 2011. 
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For Schechtman, identity is a matter of self-understanding. Her alternative theory 
(the self-understanding theory or SUT) is 'a view that develops Locke's idea that to be 
a person is to understand oneself as a persisting being in terms of the demands we 
make that our lives be intelligible' (Schechtman 2005: 20). According to this view, an 
action or experience is mine if it fits meaningfully into my life story - if I understand it 
as mine - or, in the case of an unconscious state, if it has to be posited in order to 
make sense of my life (2005: 20). Instead of demanding, like Locke, that we must 
know actions to be ours, we must understand them as ours. It is that empathic 
understanding which offers the explanation of moral responsibility that the PCT fails 
to provide. 
 
From what Schechtman writes elsewhere, we should see an additional irony here. She 
points out in The Constitution of Selves (Schechtman 1996: 15-16) that the PCT 
makes much of its ability to explain responsibility as a strong point in its favour. It 
parades this virtue as an advantage over physical continuity or animalist theories. 
And yet in its efforts to avoid the difficulties facing Locke, this promise ultimately 
appears to be empty. It may well correctly ascribe identity and responsibility in many 
cases, but it fails to meet the crucial requirement of explaining responsibility. 
 
Section 3: The discomfort of an appropriation reading 
I will return in Section 4 to the question of how much damage this criticism actually 
causes to the PCT. In the meantime, I wish to focus attention on Locke and the issues 
with which we began. Paying attention to the appropriation theory and its motivation 
that were outlined above will set the stage for discussion of the responsibility 
requirement on theories of personal identity. 
 
As the passages cited in Section 1 illustrate, some things Locke says suggest he is 
proposing an appropriation theory. The matter is not at all straightforward, however. 
First, Locke uses the term at the centre of this theory in what is clearly a different 
sense from that envisaged by appropriation theorists. Although this usage has now 
disappeared, in the seventeenth century the verb 'appropriate' had a number of 
meanings distinct from the sense of 'to take to oneself' that features in the theory. One 
is 'to make appropriate to', another 'to assign or attribute as properly pertaining to' 
(OED meanings 7 and 8 - note the inclusion of properly pertaining - the 
appropriation theory only includes what we appropriate, not what we should 
appropriate). Locke uses the word three times in his discussion3 and two of those uses 
are obviously in these archaic senses. He says the term personal identity 
'appropriat(es) Actions and their merit'. That is the archaic sense - it cannot mean 'to 
take to oneself. Elsewhere he says, 'And therefore whatever past Actions it (the self) 
cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present selfby consciousness, it can be no 
more concerned in, than if they had never been done' (346). Once again, the sense of 
'appropriate' is the archaic one of 'attribute as properly pertaining to". It makes no 
                                            
3 He uses it only these three times in the whole of Book II of the Essay. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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sense to read it as 'take to oneself". And that means there is no special reason to see 
Locke in these passages suggesting that actions are yours in your deeming them to be 
your own - it is at least as plausible (far more so) to understand him as saying that if 
actions are not properly linked to you by consciousness (i.e., you cannot remember 
them), then you cannot see yourself as responsible for them. This would fit with other 
things he says as well. 'Consciousness unites Existences, and Actions, very remote in 
time, into the same Person' (1975: 340) - only a strong desire to enforce an 
appropriation theory can lead you to see consciousness as an active subject here, 
claiming actions as its own. Locke's third application of the term is the one cited by 
Winkler above. The passage runs, it matters not whether this present self be made up 
of the same or other Substances, I being as much concern'd, and as justly accountable 
for any Action was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this 
self-consciousness, as I am, for what I did the last moment.(1975: 341) 
 
Winkler reads Locke as saying that I am concerned with the past action once I actively 
take ownership of it. But given what we have seen of Locke's other uses of 'appropri-
ate', there is no reason to see Locke as requiring consciousness to be active in this 
way. More plausibly, he is saying that if I am conscious of having performed a past 
action, then I can be concerned about it; being conscious of it makes it properly 
attributable to me - that is, appropriates it to me in the old sense. This is much the 
kind of claim Locke has traditionally been understood as making and as his 
contemporaries understood him, fitting the model of a 'memory theory' rather than 
an appropriation one. As a result, these passages provide us with no real reason to try 
and understand Locke anew. And once we see them in the way I am suggesting, the 
other evidence for taking Locke to be an appropriation theorist appears anything but 
convincing. 
 
This leads us to my second point about the appropriation theory as a reading of 
Locke. Not only does Locke use the term in a different sense from appropriation 
theorists, but the proposed theory is also at odds with other things Locke says about 
identity and personal identity. On the appropriation view, 'the self has a certain 
authority over its own constitution' (Winkler 1991: 206). This would mean that a 
theory providing the persistence conditions for persons would be of a kind utterly 
different from all those that Locke discusses before he gets to persons. Those are all 
objective principles of individuation, with different kinds of things having different 
particular objective principles. Locke distinguishes between man and person and 
insists that the persistence conditions for persons are distinct from the persistence 
conditions for human beings, but offers no suggestion that the game has changed 
altogether at this point and that we are no longer concerned with the same sort of 
persistence conditions at all. His presentation of the persistence conditions of persons 
fits exactly the previous models: 
 
For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes 
everyone to be what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational 
Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action 
or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person. (1975: 335) 
 
There is no hint here of any notion of self-constitution or authorship. There is 
self-consciousness, but we have already learned from Locke that self-consciousness is 
an essential feature of persons, just as being an organism is an essential feature of 
animals, and thus it is not surprising to find it appearing in the objective persistence 
conditions and it brings in no implication of self-construction. Persons, for Locke, are 
not substances (as humans are); but they are presented as things in their own right, 
or 'real existences' with their own persistence conditions, and not as the 
self-constructs presented by appropriation theorists. 
 
Shelley Weinberg points to a grave inconsistency between appropriation theory and 
Locke's commitments, grave at least in Locke's eyes (Weinberg 2011: 398-9). His 
concerns about responsibility have a strong theological aspect. In the passage where 
he suggests a link between the concept of personal identity and the appropriation of 
actions and their merit, his mind is on God's final judgement of us, and 'divine 
rectification'. For justice to be done, God can surely not rely on my fallible memory of 
what I have done - I may well have forgotten things for which I should be punished or 
rewarded and may 'remember' things I did not do (these latter points are raised by 
Locke himself). Since Locke is committed to divine rectification, he is committed to 
God's having objective knowledge of my identity; if God were to restore my forgotten 
memories He would need to use a criterion independent of my awareness in order to 
identify those memories as properly pertaining to me. That means there is an 
objective fact about the continuity of consciousness independent of their own 
awareness - and which is not a fact about substances - in the case of each person.4 
And that is at odds with any appropriation theory. 
 
Section 4: Against the responsibility requirement 
Even if an appropriation theory is not the view to ascribe to Locke, that does not mean 
it does not have independent merits. At least in the worked-out form of Schechtman's 
self-understanding view, it still stands to be an improvement on the rival 'Lockean' 
theory, the PCT. I have argued elsewhere (Beck forthcoming) that narrative theories 
like the SUT are not as well motivated or attractive as their proponents would have us 
believe, but that need not concern us here. The crucial point in the current case be-
tween the SUT and the PCT is Schechtman's claim that by remaining true to Locke's 
insights regarding responsibility and identity, her theory can explain responsibility 
whereas the PCT cannot. This is the issue on which this section will focus. I will argue 
that even if Schechtman is correct that her theory succeeds in offering an explanation 
of responsibility, this neither counts for her view nor against the PCT as a theory of 
                                            
4 Weinberg points (2011: 404-5) out that Locke uses 'consciousness' in two senses. One refers to 'a mental state inseparable from the act of perception 
by means of which we are aware of ourselves as perceivers'. The other refers to 'the ongoing self we are aware of in these conscious states'. 
Appropriation theorists emphasise only the first, but the second is even more important in the current context. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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personal identity. My central contention will be that Locke's requirement for an 
explanation of responsibility should not be seen as a requirement at all. 
 
The starting point of this paper and what led us into the discussion of the appropria-
tion theory was the implication by Locke that any theory of personal identity must, as 
well as providing the conditions under which a person remains the same person over 
time, provide an explanation of personal responsibility. From the discussion of 
Section 3, you might already have begun to be wary of simply accepting what Locke 
sees as requirements on theories of identity. While much of what he says makes good 
sense, part of the case against an appropriation reading turned on his rather 
questionable requirement that a theory of personal identity must also meet the 
demands of divine rectification. There may well be good reasons for wanting an 
objective third-personal criterion of identity, but divine rectification is not a serious 
contender. So we should not simply accept Locke's word on requirements - including 
that of explaining responsibility. 
 
On the face of things, it is not immediately clear why a theory of personal identity 
should be tasked with explaining responsibility. It is after all, at least following the 
way that Locke sets things up, a theory of what makes a person the same individual 
over time (a 'principium Individuationis' (1975: 330)). Since none of the principles he 
suggests for other kinds of things have any intimations of morality, this feature would 
be peculiar to this one kind of thing. Locke is clear that the persistence conditions of a 
thing will depend on what kind of thing it is, and that seems intuitively correct; so it is 
to the nature of personhood that we must look. And one of the widely agreed points 
(certainly between narrative theories and the PCT) is that, at a fundamental level, 
persons are agents. 
 
Being an agent means you are a moral subject as well as a moral object, which implies 
the capacity for moral responsibility. So there is indeed a conceptual link between 
personhood and responsibility. This much is accounted for in the PCT. It offers 
persistence conditions for the sort of thing that is appropriate as a bearer of moral re-
sponsibility, highlighting in them sophisticated psychological states which would in-
clude second-order attitudes of the kind that allow ascriptions of responsibility. But it 
does not go the distance of making a stronger link between personal identity and re-
sponsibility as demanded by Schechtman and appropriation theorists. The point is 
that it does not follow from there being a conceptual link between personhood and 
responsibility that there is any such link between personal identity and 
responsibility, at least not one that would require a theory of personal identity to 
explain responsibility. The inference fails to go through because, while the distinctive 
features of a kind might well appear in its persistence conditions, those conditions do 
not have to concern all - or indeed any - distinctive features. For example, every 
electron must have a particular spin, but spin will not be mentioned in the persistence 
conditions of electrons. So, personal identity need have nothing to do with 
responsibility simply because persons must have the capacity for responsibility. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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You may be concerned that this response turns on a technicality. Even if it does not 
follow necessarily that identity must explain responsibility, there are independent 
reasons to think that it should. As we saw earlier, there are proponents of the PCT 
who themselves propose this as a feature that recommends their theory. But there is 
no general agreement to be found here, even among theorists of personal identity. 
Eric Olson presents a theory of identity that eschews responsibility entirely. On his 
theory (Olson 1997: 52), if your cerebrum were transplanted into another body, 
leaving your body that of 'a brainless being that can still breathe, digest, and do 
whatever a human being can do without being conscious', you would be that brainless 
being and not the psychologically functioning being who thinks they are you. The 
thinking being would be responsible for your actions, but would not be you. It might 
be objected that Olson has changed the subject, and that his persons are not 
persistents that are necessarily moral agents and are thus not persons at all, but 
something else. That sounds like a reasonable point to me, but it remains that the 
issue of whether personal identity must have a link to responsibility is moot. It is not 
as if Olson's contention that you are not the thinking survivor is obviously 
incoherent, 5  as the claim for a conceptual link between personal identity and 
responsibility seems to require: to insist on such a link would be, in the 
circumstances, to beg the question. 
 
Perhaps a more important point concerns the vagaries of responsibility. If there is a 
conceptual link between identity and responsibility it will be through the principle 
that you are responsible for all and only your actions. But this principle is a 
questionable one, to say the least - and that is because responsibility is much more 
complex and messy than the principle allows. It is obvious that you are not 
responsible for all of your actions - those you were forced to do being the prime 
example. You are not responsible for actions that were not autonomous, but they are 
still your actions. 
 
That you are not responsible for only your own actions is less obvious. Schechtman 
considers cases of parents being held responsible for their children's actions or of 
people being responsible for things that others do as a result of their actions. She 
rejects these as counter-examples to the principle on the grounds that there is, in 
these cases, a primary ascription of an action or omission to the agent in question and 
that is really where the responsibility falls, leaving the model unaffected (1997: 14 
fn15). But even if you find that convincing, there are other counter-examples that are 
not so easy to dismiss. A central tenet of Christianity is that Jesus takes responsibility 
for the sins of (some) humans - his sacrifice absolves those who performed the actions 
by taking the responsibility on himself. He is not simply receiving the punishment on 
their behalf, but taking the responsibility away from them. You might not believe that 
this works, but it is by no means incomprehensible and it marks the concept of 
responsibility as more complex than the proposed principle acknowledges. Nor are 
                                            
5 The same sort of claim is made by Peter Unger in the context of a non-animalist theory of personal identity (Unger 1992: 162). 
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these complexities only evident in religious thought. Many young white South 
Africans feel responsibility for Apartheid and its consequences even though they had 
no causal role in it whatsoever, just as some post-war Germans feel for Nazi atrocities. 
In the South African case this feeling is widely seen by others as appropriate.6 You 
might argue that it is misguided, or should be seen as based in something other than 
responsibility. Whatever the case may be, commonsense morality appears to allow for 
a range of vagaries when it comes to responsibility, where responsibility and personal 
identity come apart. 
 
Where does this leave the issue of what is required from a theory of personal identity? 
It means that the requirement that Schechtman and others ascribe to Locke and use 
as a tool against the PCT is not a legitimate one. Personal identity does not necessarily 
even coincide with moral responsibility, so there cannot be a requirement on a theory 
of identity that it go even further and explain responsibility in the sense of what it is 
that makes you responsible. The most that could be asked of such a theory is that it 
explain why it is you that is responsible when you are in fact responsible, and that is 
precisely what it does: it offers (like Locke) an account of the persistence of an entity 
that is the appropriate subject of judgements of moral responsibility. This acknowl-
edges that there is a relationship between responsibility and personal identity, but 
(rightly) does not require that to be any sort of necessary connection. The theory 
should not be asked to account for all cases of responsibility and what it certainly 
cannot be asked to do is explain why you are responsible. That also seems to be part 
of what Schechtman argues that the PCT fails to do. Not only does this go beyond 
what a metaphysics of identity should offer, but it also confuses the demand to 
explain normativity with the requirements of a metaphysics of persistence. On these 
grounds, at least, no case has been presented that should move anyone from a 
psychological continuity theory to any other view of identity.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
6 See the discussion on Samantha Vice's work on this topic in the special edition of the South African Journal of Philosophy 30(4), 2011. 
7 I am grateful to Olga Yurkivska, Thad Metz and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier draft. 
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